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Articles
LEARNING MORE THAN LAW FROM MARYLAND DECISIONS

By Ian Gallacher!
As lawyers and law students, we look at cases in a
somewhat clinical manner. We tend to glide over the facts
and concentrate on the point oflaw articulated by the court.
If we need to use a case to support a position we are taking,
or if we want to distinguish a case used by an opponent, we
might look to the facts of the case to see if they affect our
argument. But the facts themselves, and the story they can
tell us about the people involved, are often ignored
There is nothing surprising or wrong about this. We
are lawyers, after all, not historians or sociologists, and our
clients are not interested about why Mr. Tompkins was
walking on the tracks of the Erie Railroad Company or
whether Krause v. Rhodes tells us more about life inAmerica
in 1970 than it does about the narrow legal issues discussed
by the Supreme Court. But just as our clients require us to
focus on theirneeds and to solve their problems, we should
remember that each ofthe cases we use as the building blocks
of the common law meant something profoundly more
important to the individual litigants.
Three years ago I was looking for the fIrst reported
class action in Maryland in support ofan article I was writing?
My search methodology was not the sophisticated plan taught
in the University ofBaltimore's LARW program. Rather, I
started reading on the fIrst page of the fIrst volume of the
Maryland Reports and kept going until I found the case. The
search was short - but when I read the case3 I realized that
it offered an insight into much more than the history of
representative litigation in Maryland It, and two subsequently
reported decisions4 tell a compelling story oflife in rural
Maryland in the middle ofthe 19th Century. They also tell of
courage, the importance offreedom, and the corrosive quality
ofgreed. And, ifthese other elements were not enough, they
teach us lessons about 19th Century civil procedure, evidence
and trial practice as well.
1. John and Jeremiah Townshend
In the middle of the 19th Century, John Townshend

was a fanner in the Piscataway district ofPrince George's

County, where he probably fanned tobacco on his 1,500
acre fann. John was a religious man who claimed to speak
directly with God, andhad long been regarded as an eccentric
in the area. Despite his religious beliefs, John was a working
famler with a sizeable fann to manage. As with all
businessmen, John occasionally sought to maximize his profits
by minimizing his expenses; the cheapest source of fann
wolkers inAmericaatthattime was slave labot Accordingly,
John maintained about 70 slaves on his property.
John's conscience was troubled by his slave
ownership. His divine conversations soon helped clarifY a
plan to free his slaves. But, as a pragmatic famler, John could
not free the slaves in1mediately. So on Christmas Eve 1831,
and again on February 6, 1846, John executed deeds of
manumission that freed the slaves at his death. Indeed, he
went further than that and left his slaves all his real estate,
including his farm. This must have been a crushing blow for
John'sson,Jeremiah.
We know only a little about Jeremiah Townshend.
He was 28 years old when his father died, and was married
with at least one child. The first accurate infonnation we
have about him comes from the 1850 Federal Census which
tells us that, by then, he had five children and lived on land
valued at $1,260. The slave schedule attached to the 1850
census indicates two Townshends in the Piscataway district
who were slave owners. The first, William Townshend,
(perhaps Jeremiah's brother orunc1e) had eight slaves. The
initial ofthe second Townshend is unreadable, but it is likely
that this second Townshend was Jeremiah. At the time ofthe
1850 census, Jeremiah had increased the number of slaves
on the fann to 99, 58 men and boys, and 41 women and
girls, ranging in age from 2 to 77 years old. No further
infonnation about the slaves is recorded.

IT.

The Legal Maneuvering Begins

John died in May 1846, and Jeremiah acted to
consolidate his position. He, along with John's other heirs,
32.1 U. Balt. L.F. 3
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filed a petition in the Orphan's Court of Prince George's
County, and later in the Circuit Court for Prince George's
County, clairningthatJohn had been insane since 1794. This
was an astounding contention: a son was claiming that his
father had been insane for 50 years, despite John's ability to
farm the land and otherwise manage his affairs. Nonetheless,
the petition was successful and John's will was declared null
and void. As soon as it was, Jeremiah took possession of
John's 70 slaves and presumably assumedhis battle for control
ofhis father's property was over. But the invalidation ofJohn's
will had no effect on his deeds ofmanumission, and in 1847,
two slaves - known only by their first names, "Jeny" and
"Anthony" - petitioned for freedom based on these deeds.
Their petition was filed on behalf ofthemselves and the 68
other slaves whom John had sought to free.
The slaves faced a daunting prospect. They must
have known little, if anything, about the legal mechanisms
necessary to bring their petition, and the odds were stacked
against them by the Maryland legislature. Chapter 67 ofthe
1796 Acts of the General Assembly of Maryland was a clear
attempt to dissuade members of the Maryland bar from
helping slaves obtain their freedom, stating that in all cases of
petitions for freedom where the petition was dismissed:
the attomeyprosecuting or appearing to the
same shall pay all legal costs arising thereon,
unless the courts, before whom the same
may be brought, shall be of the opinion,
under all circumstances, that there was
probable ground to suppose that said
petitioner or petitioners had a right to
freedom.
Even worse, the Act decreed that all petitions for freedom
should "commence and be tried only in the county where
such petitioner or petitioners shall reside." Both parties to the
petition for freedom could request a jury trial and exercise
peremptory challenges to up to twelve of the prospective
Jurors.

In other words, even ifJerry and Anthony could find
a lawyer willing to incur the costs of a failed petition for
freedom, their case would be heard in Prince George's County,
and Jeremiah Townshend could not only require the case to
be heard by a jury, he would be able to exercise sufficient
32.1 U. BaIt L.F. 4

challenges to ensure that the jury was, in large part, composed
of fanners and slave owners like himself. Slaves seeking
freedom could hardly face a less sympathetic audience.
Despite the odds, Jerry and Anthony found a lawyer,
Thomas S. Alexander, who stayed with them throughout the
nine years their case moved through Maryland's legal system.
I have been unable to find to more about Alexander, but in
addition to being loyal to clients unable to fmancially
compensate him for his work, and being someone willing to
incur significant potential expenses as the result of his
representation (not usual practice for lawyers, even in the
19th Century), he was clearly someone who knew what he
was doing.
Recognizing the impossibility of winning the case in
front of a Prince George's County jury, Alexander sought to
remove the case to Anne Arundel County. In support, he
filed an affidavit alleging that the slaves could not obtain a fair
and impartial trial in Prince George's County, and invoked
Chapter 518 ofthe Acts of 1849 which provided that:
in any suit or action oflaw now
pending, or hereafter to be
commenced or instituted, in any
county courts ofthis State, or in the
court ofHowardDistrict, the judges
thereof, upon suggestion in writing,
by either ofthe parties thereto or
their attorneys, supported by
affidavit or other proper evidence,
either before or after issue joined in
said cause, that a fair and impartial
trial cannot be had in the county
courts ofthe county, or in the court
ofHoward district [sic.] where such
writ or action may be depending,
shall and may order and direct the
record oftheir proceedings in such
suit or action, to be transmitted to
the judges of any county court of
any a£ljoiningjudicia1 districtfortrial,
and the judges of such county
court, to whom the said record may
be transmitted, shall hear and
detennine the same in like manner
and to the same extent as if such
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suit or action had been originally
instituted therein.
Alexander's strategy worked at first: the Prince
George's County court allowed the removal. But Jeremiah
petitioned in Anne Arundel County Court for a remand ofthe
case to Prince George's County, and his petition was granted.
This decision was appealed to the Court of Appeals, and the
case made the first of its three appearances before that court
in 1852.

m.

The First Court OfAppeals Decision
Jeremiah Townshend had also retained a lawyer, and
in contrast to the little we know omomasAlexander, much
is known about his counterpart, Thomas Fielder Bowie.
"General" Bowie, as he was known, was born in 1808 in
Pl1nce George's County, and was educated at Charlotte Hall
and Union College in Schenectady. He had served as Deputy
Attorney General for Prince George's County, and had also
been elected to the State Legislature. Bowie mounted an
unsuccessful challenge to his cousin's Congressional seat in
1851, and in 1854 he was successful in his Congressional
bid, and sat for two terms. He died in 1869.
Bowie raised two technical questions before the
Court ofAppeals: first, he questioned the constitutionality of
chapter 518 ofthe 1849 Act which Alexander had used to
gain the removal ofthe case to Anne Arundel county; second,
he questioned whether a petition for freedom was a suit at
law, as required by Chapter 518. Although this second point
appeared to be a relatively benign question, it was potentially
devastating to Jerry andAnthony's case. Maryland slaves
could not bring actions at law. Accordingly, if a petition for
freedom was not an action at law-and self-evidently it could
not be, because it could only be brought by a slave - then
Chapter 518 could not, under its plain terms, apply to the
case. The case would therefore have to be heard in Prince
George's County.
Somewhat paradoxically, Bowie then used the
common law in support of his firstposition. He argued that,
because the common law provided that a trial should be
argued in the same vicinage where a fact occurred, any
legislation which pennitted the removal ofa case beyond tlle
bounds ofthe judicial district where the relevant acts occurred
was in derogation of the common law and therefore

unconstitutional.
The three judges of the Court of Appeals (Chief
Justice Le Grand and Justices Eccleston and Mason) who
heard the case were not inlpressed with Bowie's argument.
Justice Mason delivered the court's opinion, in which he
observed that the 1849 Act was consistent with Maryland's
constitution, and that the ability oftlle legislature to "regulate
at will the subject of removals" had been well established
since at leasttlle Act of1804. Accordingly, the Court found
tlle 1849 Actto be constitutional and held that cases meeting
its requirements could be removed from one judicial district
to anotller.
On the second, and more difficult, question, tlle Court
ofAppeals confronted the problem directly.
All laws fortlle removal of causes
from one vicinage to another, were
passed for the purpose of
promoting the ends ofjustice, by
getting rid oftlle influence ofsome
local prejudice which might be
supposed to operate detrimentally
to the interests and rights of one or
the other ofthe parties to the suit.
This is a common law right
belonging to all our courts, and as
such can be exercised by them in
all cases, when not modified or
controlled by our constitutional or
statutory enactments . ... The
reason ofthe law would apply witll
equal force to a case like the
present, as to one strictly and
technically embraced within the
term "action at law." Theplaintiff
in the present suit, ofall tlle classes
in our community, belongs to that
whichisthemostdefenseless. Our
laws give him a standing in court to
prosecute his petition for freedom.
An unimpeachable attorney ofthe
court makes oath that he cannot
have justice done him in his own
county. Under such circumstances,
would it not be a mockery ofjustice
32.1 U. Bait. L.F. 5
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to refuse him his application to
have the cause removed? Would
it not involve a contradiction of
temlS to say that he shall have
the benefit of our courts of
justice, but at the same time that
his case shall be tried in a county
where he cannot have a fair and
inlpartial trial?
TIlis is an interesting early example of judicial
nullification. Aplain reading ofthe 1849Act supports Bowie's
position, yetthe Court of Appeals recognized that to give the
Act its plain meaning would deprive the slaves ofany realistic
opportunity to exercise their limited rights under Maryland
law. Accordingly, the Court ofAppeals held that a petition
for freedom, although not technically an action at law, was
"embraced within the meaning ofthe terms' suit or action at
law. ,,, JeTI)' and Anthony's case would be heard in Anne
Arundel County.
N. The Second Court OfAppeals Decision
Jeremiah Townshend was not finished. Thomas
Bowie was no longer his lawyer - whether because Jeremiah
was dissatisfied with his representation, because of a fee
dispute or because Bowie was preparing for his successful
Congressional bid is unclear - but Jeremiah had an interesting
legal strategy up his sleeve. He filed a bill in equity back in the
Circuit Court for Prince George's County, arguing that his
father's insanity meant that his deeds ofmanumission should
be considered inoperative and invalid. He also
acknowledged, however, that the deeds appeared to be valid
and that he would therefore be compelled to defend against
them. Thus, Jeremiah argued, he would be "putto enOffi1OUS
and ruinous costs from the multiplicity ofsuits, and be unjustly
and greatly harassed, and put to great charges in defending
the same, which will be a direct charge upon the common
property ofcomplainants." Hence, he sought consolidation
ofall the claims offreedom in one equity suit and an injunction
restraining the petitions for freedom from being heard until
Jolm Townshend's personal estate (which included the slaves)
was divided among his heirs, and until the issue of John
Townshend's sanity had been litigated.
Jeremiah's position conveniently ignored the factthat
32.1 U. BaIt L.F. 6

the slaves were bringing one petition for freedom that
would resolve the rights of all slaves manumitted by John
Townshend. His solution to the straw problem he had
set up has an eerily contemporary ring to it. In essence,
Jeremiah sought a cram-down class action, whereby a
defendant seeks to litigate an issue one time against all
potential plaintiffs.
This is a little-used but recognized class action tactic,
usually invoked by a confident defendant in an attempt to
gain the preclusive effect ofa class victory that an individual
win would not provide. Certainly that was the case with
Jeremiah: although the Court of Appeals' decision required
JeTI)' and Anthony's case to be heard in Anne Arundel
County, Judge Crain of the Prince George's Circuit Court
granted the injunction, meaning that Jeremiah's injunction
would be heard by a Prince George's chancellor, not an Anne
Arundel judge.
However, the Court of Appeals was not amused.
Although several issues were raised on appeal, the court
decided that it need only rule on one of them to dismiss
Jeremiah Townshend's equity bill. Justice Mason recognized
the implications of Jeremiah's strategy, and wrote thatthe
"alleged slave" would be unable to challenge his servile status
ifthe injunction was heard in Prince George's County. The
court held thatJohn Townshend's sanity, and his capacity to
execute a deed ofmanumission, would be detennined by the
same tribunal that heard the petition for freedom. The court's
irritation with Jeremiah's ploy is evident from the tone ofthe
opinion, and from the fact that it levied costs against him, not
only for the Court of Appeals proceedings but also for the
proceedings in Prince George's County.
V.

The Trial and Final Appeal

At some point in the proceedings, Anthony appears
to have ceased to be a plaintiff. His name is not listed in the
caption ofthird Court ofAppeals decision, and the Court's
second opinion refers to the "alleged slave" in the singular.
Mosttellingly, the trial in Anne Arundel County began with
Jeremiah Townshend's contention thatJerty, and only Jerty,
was over 45 years old when John Townshend executed his
deedofmanumission. 5 1tis unknown whether Anthony had
died in the interim, he lost his willingness to continue as a
plaintiffin the action, or whether the slaves had realized that
he was so clearly over 45 that his continued presence in the
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case would hann the other slaves' chances of freedom.
The trial court refused to grant Jeremiah's request for a
directed verdict based on Jerry's age and the case
proceeded.
As Jeremiah had admitted during his petition for
an injunction, the deeds of manumission appeared to be
valid on their face. Accordingly, the evidentiary burden
was on him to show that his father was insane when he
executed the deeds, and he applied himself to the task
with gusto. He produced a witness who testified that he
had known John Townshend between 1826 and 1831 and
that he had conversed frequently with John during this
time. From John's conduct, manner, conversations and
general appearance, this witness testified that, in his
opinion, John Townshend was insane and incapable of
executing a valid deed or contract. This witness also
testified to other conversations he had had with John
subsequent to his execution of the 1831 deed of
manumission "to throw light upon the state of his mind
at the time of its execution." Despite Alexander's
objections, this testimony and the testimony of other
witnesses offering substantially the same testimony was
admitted.
But the most damaging testimony offered by Jeremiah
came from Dr. John F onderen, the director of Maryland's
Hospital for the Insane. Dr. F onderen had attended the trial
and listened to the testimony ofthe other witnesses. Jeremiah's
attorney then called him to take the stand and asked him the
following question:

third time, the slaves found themselves before the Court of
Appeals. This time, though, the Court ruled against them.
Justice Mason wrote that the admissibility ofevidence tending
to show John Townshend's alleged insanity prior to and at
the time of the execution of the 1831 deed was not
objectionable. Moreover, the testimony concerning John's
mental status after the 1831 deed was executed was similarly
admissible "because it tended to show the nature and
character ofthe insanity under which the party was supposed
to labor." In this regard, the court found the continuing nature
of John Townshend's eccentric behavior to be of particular
importance.
The Court of Appeals was less certain about Dr.
Forderen's testimony, noting that the issue was "not free from
difficulty upon the authorities."
Upon an examination ofthe cases it will be
found, that there is considerable conflict
among them. It is clear that you cannot ask
a witness, an expert, his opinion, as to the
state of a party's mind, upon the evidence
submitted to the jury. To do so would be to
transfer the functions of the jury to the
witness, and would pennit him to decide
upontheveryfactatissue,andthustocontrol
the verdict ofthe jUl)'. It is equally clear, on
the other hand, that you may ask such a
witness his opinion upon a state offacts,
hypothetically put, based upon the evidence,
and this is in fact, the proper way to submit
such questions to a witness.

Upon the hypothesis thatthe testimony given
by the witnesses in this case, ofthe acts and
declarations ofJohn Townshend as to his
personal intercourse with God, is all true,
and that at the time Townshend made these
declarations, as to this intercourse and its
character, he believed what he declared,
what would be your opinion as to the
condition of his mind at the times of such
declarations?

Although the Court was not happy with the fOt1l1 of
the question as asked by Jererniah's attorney, it decided that
it was sufficiently close to the usual form ofsuch questions
that the trial court did not commit reversible error in allowing
it. Accordingly, the Court held that there was no reversible
error and affinned the jury's verdict.

Over objection, this question was allowed and, although the
answer is unrecorded, it cannot have been favorable to Jeny
and the other slaves.
The trial court ruled in favor ofJeremiah and, for the

Nine years after their bid for freedom had begun,
Jeremiah Townshend's slaves had no more options open to
them. They would remain slaves for another eight years when,
in the wake of the Civil War, the Maryland Constitution was

VI.

Conclusion

32.1 U. Balt. L.F. 7
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amended and slavery was abolished. Nothing more is
known about them.
Jeremiah died in 1892, at age 74, and is buried
together with his wife and children in the McKendree
Methodist Church Cemetety Ironically, an unidentified family
slave (it seems unlikely to be Jerry) also has an unmarked
grave in the family plot.
There are many lessons to be drawn from this trilogy
of opinions from the Court of Appeals. Apart from insights
into what was deemed to be appropriate trial practice in the
1850's, the realization that seemingly contemporary legal
maneuvering has been around fora longtime, and a recognition
of the beneficial inlpact one dedicated pro bono lawyer can
make, the cases teach us powerful lessons about the
importance of freedom and the lengths to which those who
will be economically disadvantaged by it will go to keep people
enslaved
On a less emotionally charged plane, though, perhaps
the overarching general lesson that these 150 year-old
decisions can offer is that cases are more than just dry
recitations ofthe law. To the extent that this case will ever be
studied for its legal significance, it stands as one ofthe early
leading opinions on intra-state removal, as well being the
earliest reported class action in Maryland For those involved
in the case, though, and hopefully for US today as well, ittells
us that cases are about people, not just principles. As lawyers,
and as citizens, this is an inlportant lesson to remember. 6
Ilnstructor-in-Residence, Legal Rhetoric Department,
The Washington College of Law, American University. B.A.
(Hons.), University of Leeds, M.F.A., Carnegie-Mellon
University, J.D., The Washington College of Law, American
University. Thanks as always to Julia McKinstry.
2 Representative Litigation in Maryland: The Past,
Present, And Future Of The Class Action Rule In State Court,
58 U. Md. L. Rev. 1510 (1999). A shorter version of the
story told here can be found in this article.
3 Owens v. Bowie, 2 Md. 457 (1852).
4 Townshend v. Townshend, 5 Md. 287 (1853);
Jeny v. Townshend, 9 Md. 145 (1856).
5This was an important point. Under Maryland law,
a slave over 45 could not be manumitted.
6 In addition to the Court of Appeals of Maryland's
decisions, and the various statutory enactments referred to in
the text, the following materials supplied valuable infonnation:
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